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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
PAUL RAY SHEFFIELD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
- vs -

JOHN TURNER, Warden of the Utah State
Prison; STATE OF UTAH; JOHN DOE;
JOHN DOE; JOHN DOE; JOHN DOE;
and JOHN DOE,

Case No.
10837

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from a dismissal of the complaint in an action to recover damages for personal
injuries.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson dismissed appellant's
amended complaint on the grounds that the action
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was barred by Utah Code Ann.
1967).

§

63-30-10(10) (Supp.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents submit that the judgment of dismissal should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 6, 1966, while appellant was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison, he was stabbed in the
eye with a sharp instrument by a fellow inmate. As
a result, appellant lost the sight in that eye. On November 25, 1966, appellant commenced a civil action
against the respondents John Turner and the five
John Does. On December 8, 1966, the complaint was
amended to include the State of Utah as a party defendant. The complaint alleged that the warden of
the Utah State Prison and his authorized agents
were negligent in supervising the inmates and as a
result appellant was injured by a fellow inmate.
Appellant then prayed for judgment against the defendants in the sum of $100,000.
A motion to dismiss the complaint was filed on
behalf of the respondents and the matter was argUed
and heard on January 27, 1967. An order dismissing
the complaint against all named defendants was entered on January 31, 1967.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT AGAINST JOHN
TURNER AND THE FIVE JOHN DOES IN THAT THEY
ARE PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHO WERE ENGAGED IN
THE PERFORMANCE OF A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION; THEY DID NOT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY OF THEIR OFFICES; AND THEY WERE
THUS IMMUNE FROM CIVIL SUIT.

Appellant in his brief (p. 9) concedes that Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (Supp. 1967) justifies a dismissal of the complaint against the State of Utah.
Therefore, this court must only decide whether the
trial court erred in dismissing the complaint as to
John W. Turner, Warden of the Utah State Prison,
and the five John Does.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is a statutory expression
of the common law principle that the sovereign is
immune from suit. The Act does, however, allow suit
against the sovereign in certain specific instances.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (Supp. 1967) provides:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act,
all governmental entities shall be immune from
suit for any injury which may result from the activities of said entities wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function.

Although the Act refers only to "governmental
entities," respondent submits that the immunity ex-

pressed by the statute extends to officers of a governmental unit, so long as such officers are engaged
in the exercise and discharge of a governmental
function and so long as they do not exceed the
scope of power of their particular office. It is respondent's position that the sovereign immunity of
the state serves as a protection from personal liability for governmental officials while they are acting
within the scope of power of their office. Such position is predicated on the fact that the only authority
under which a governmental official may act is that
of the governmental unit. Thus, so long as an official is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a
governmental function, and provided that he does
not exceed the authority of his office, he should be
entitled to the same immunity from suit as the governmental entity.
The above view is that adopted by the courts
of the federal system in determining the personal
liability of officers and employees of the federal government. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959);
Lanq v. Wood, 92 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Greqoire
v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964).
Public policy would seem to require that public
officials be free from the threat of civil suit if they
are acting in the course of their employment, and so
long as they do not exceed the authority of their office. Public officials should be able to act freely and
fearlessly in the discharge of their official functions.
Should this court hold that civil suits may be brought
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against public officials in their private capacity
when the act for which suit is brought arises out of
the discharge of official functions, competent and
responsible persons will be dissuaded from accepting the responsibilities of public office. And those
persons holding public office will be less than enthusiastic in the performance of their duties.
The above reasoning is especially applicable in
the case before this court. Here we are dealing with
the supervision of convicted felons who, no doubt,
resent the supervision imposed upon them by the
state and who will jump at every opportunity to
harass those charged with their supervision. To allow prison inmates to sue the warden and guards
of a prison in their private capacity for acts occurring within the scope of their employment would
paralyze the functioning of the penal system, for the
warden and the guards would be forced to cater to
the whim and caprice of the inmates or subject themselves to numerous civil suits.
It should be pointed out here that the immunity
afforded an officer of government under this interpretation applies only where the official is engaged
in the exercise and discharge of a governmental
function and only when the scope of authority of his
office has not been exceeded. Should an officer exceed the scope of authority of his office, the view
that the only authority under which he acts is the
authority of the governmental unit no longer holds
true and thus the immunity is no longer available.
Based upon the above reasoning, the respon-
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;:ients subrrm mat the lower court did not err m di::smissing the complaint as to Tohn Turner and the five
John Does in that they were goevrnmental officials
acting within the scope of their authority in discharging a governmental function, and were thus
protected by the sovereign immunity of the state.
Respondents submit that even should this court
decide that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
specifically Utah Code Ann. ~ 63-30-3 (Supp. 1967)
and Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (Supp. 1967), will
not bear the interpretation as set forth above, the
reasoning set forth above as to the immunity of the
governmental entity extending to an official applies
as a common law principle and constitutes proper
grounds justifying the dismissal by the lower court
of the complaints against John Turner and the five
John Does.
It is an accepted principle of law that an order
of a trial court will be sustained if proper grounds
existed therefor, regardless of the reasons set forth
by the trial judge. Filipoff v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.
132, 364 ·P.2d 315 (1961); accord. In re Garrison's
Estate, 59 Nev. 302, 91 P.2d 818 (1939).

Respondents further submit that the trial court
committed no error in dismissing the complaint as
to John Turner and the five John Does in that such
parties are officers or employees of state government and as such are immune from suit for tortious
conduct, if such conduct occurs in the performance
of official duties, if such duties are discretionary in
nature, and if there is no malice or fraud evidenced.
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See Cander v. Steiner, 225 Md. 271, 170 A.2d 271
(1961); Gurley v. Brown, 65 Nev. 245, 193 P.2d 693
(1948); Kisielewski v. State, 68 N.J. Super. 258, 172
A.2d 203 (1961); Travis v. Pinto, 87 N.J. Super. 263,
208 A.2d 828 (1965); 43 Am. Jur. Public Officers§ 279
(1942).
The immediately above-cited cases all deal with
suits by inmates of penal institutions for the alleged
tortious acts of supervising officials. Of particular in~erest is Travis v. Pinto, supra. In that case the plaintiff sought damages from the superintendent of a
prison farm and his deputy for injuries received
when the plaintiff was assaulted by a fellow prisoner. The Superior Court of New Jersey in holding that
the plaintiff had no cause of action stated:
Whether a public officer, or employee, is clothed
with immunity in the performance or nonperformance of an act in the course of his public service,
depends upon the nature of his duties and the
nature and quality of the allegedly tortious act
or omission with which he is charged.
It is well recognized in the law that an officer is
not absolved for his private or personal torts. Prosser on Torts, § 109, p. 780 (1955), and where he
commits a tort in the performance of official duties
the question arises of whether his duties are 'discretionary or quasi- judicial,' in which event he is
immune from suit, or whether they are 'ministerial,'
in which event he becomes liable for them regard:ess of good faith. Prosser, supra, at pages 781-782.

The court further stated:

We think, however, the duties of the appellee [the
"':Jrden] herein of which complaint is made in the
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declaration fall within that class which has been
designated as quasi-judicial, and, as stated above,
involve the exercise of a considerable latitude of
discretion. As the chief executive officer of the
Maryland State Reformatory, he is the custodian of
its inmates and the proper performance of the
functions of his office, without detailing his duties,
requires him to make many decisions that call for
the exercise of judgment and discretion. When the
complaint is for the failure to perform or properly
to perform duties falling within this category, the
text-writers and cases, while recognizing that judicial officers are liable for the negligent performance
of purely ministerial duties under some circumstances, seem to be in universal accord in holding
that the public officer is immune from liability, at
least, in the absence of a showing of malice. Cocking v. Wade, 87 Md. 529, 40 A.104, 40 L.R.A. 628;
Shearman and Redfield, op. cit., Secs. 324; Cooley,
op. cit., Sec. 299,300; Harper and James, op. cit.,
Sec. 29.10.
Generally, an official duty is ministerial when it
is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed
and designated facts. Discretionary or judicial duties are such as necessarily require the exercise of
reason in the adaptation of the means to an end,
and discretion in determining how or whether the
act shall be done or the course pursued. 14 A.L.R.2d 357 ( 1950).

The duties imposed by Repl. Vol. Utah Code
Ann. § 64-9-13 (1961) and Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
§ 64-9-38 (1961) involve the exercise of a considerable latitude of discretion. The proper performance
of both the duties of the warden and the guards requires them to make decisions calling for the exer-
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cise of judgment and discretion. Especially is this
so where the supervision of prison inmates is concerned.
Respondent submits that since there was no
showing of malice, and since John Turner and the
five John Does were performing discretionary duties
in the furtherance of official responsibilities, such
parties are immune from suit; therefore, it was
proper for the lower court to dismiss.
The Utah cases cited by appellant in his brief
can be distinguished from the case at bar in that
they were all concerned with tortious acts occurring
where the officer had exceeded the scope of his
authority or where the officer was performing a
ministerial act; therefore, such cases are of no help
in deciding the case now before this court.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the above-cited cases, it is clear
that the respondents were immune from suit; thus,
the trial court committed no error in dismissing the
amended complaint. Therefore, respondent submits
that the order of dismissal should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General

D. GILBERT ATHAY

Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondents

